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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.

This Court lacks jurisdiction of this matter as Appellants1
Notice of Appeal was untimely filed. Appellants1 Notice of Appeal
was not filed until October 27, 1995, more than 100 days after the
trial court's July 10, 1995 Orders disposing of all claims.
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. E.g.,
State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (time for filing
an appeal is jurisdictional); Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 P.2d
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(court lacked jurisdiction to consider
cross-appeal that was not timely filed).

This argument is more

fully set forth infra, at section V L B , pp. 16-18.1
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

The following issues are presented for appeal with respect to
Appellee Attorney Dale Gardiner:
1.

Should this Court disregard or strike Appellants1 Brief

for its blatant failure to comply with Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and summarily affirm the Judgment by the trial
court?
2.

Does this Court lack jurisdiction over this appeal as a

result of Appellants' filing of their Notice of Appeal more than
100 days after the trial court's orders disposing of all claims?

1

Moreover, the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal is
the basis of Appellee Dale Gardiner's Motion for Summary
Disposition filed December 11, 1995, and that motion is
incorporated herein by reference.
The Utah Supreme Court has
deferred ruling on this Motion pending further consideration. See
March 20, 1996 Order, signed by Associate Chief Justice I. Daniel
Stewart.

3,

Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment on

Appellants1 claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, interference,
civil extortion and coercion, negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and consequential damages asserted against
Attorney Gardiner when the undisputed evidence shows that Attorney
Gardiner did not file the complaint, was forced by a conflict of
interest to withdraw before trial, and took no actions except those
allowed under the Rules of Civil Procedure during the window in
which he represented Appellants1 adversaries?
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS.

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this
appeal.
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Appellants were opposing parties in prior lawsuits brought by

Attorney Gardiner's former clients, Appellees Robert J. and Joan
DeBry, in the Third Judicial District Court and the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.

More than a year after

the

Gardiner

actions

were

commenced,

Attorney

appearances on behalf of the DeBrys.

entered

his

He represented the DeBrys

until August 31, 1989 when a conflict of interest arising out of a
pending divorce between the DeBrys necessitated his withdrawal.
The Third District Court litigation was eventually resolved, in
part by stipulation and in part by litigation. In that litigation,
2

Appellants prevailed on some claims, and the Appellee DeBrys
prevailed on some.

The Federal Court litigation was eventually

dismissed as a result of the resolution of the Third District Court
lawsuit.
Thereafter, Appellants brought this multi-claim action against
numerous parties, including Attorney Gardiner.

In their 80-page

unverified complaint, which contained more than 450 allegations,
Appellants asserted the following causes of action against Attorney
Gardiner:
Fifth:
Tenth:
Eleventh:
Twelfth:
Twenty Second:
Twenty Third:
Twenty Fourth:

Abuse of Process
Conspiracy
Interference
Civil Extortion and Coercion
Negligence
Abuse of Process
Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
Consequential Damages

Thirty Second:
Appellants1

claims

against

Attorney

Gardiner

all

relate

to

procedural actions he took on behalf of his clients in the
litigation during the window Attorney Gardiner acted as the lawyer
for Appellants' adversaries.
B.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT.
1.

On March 20, 1995, Appellants filed their Consolidated

Amended Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

[Record 2726-2805].2

2

All citations, unless otherwise noted, are to the
original record index of District Court No. 920903507, Supreme
Court No. 960066, as paginated pursuant to 11(b) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure and filed with the Utah Supreme Court on
April 29, 1996.
3

2.

On March 30, 1995, Appellee Gardiner filed a "Motion to

Dismiss, Or In The Alternative For Summary Judgment On, Plaintiffs1
Consolidated

Amended

Complaint,w

and

supporting

memorandum.3

[Record 2839-2842 & 2847-2964, respectively].
3.

Appellants submitted a response and Appellee Gardiner

filed a reply.

[Record 3167-3179 & 3384-3443, respectively].

Thereafter, Appellants filed an additional pleading captioned
"Plaintiffs [sic] Supplemental Citations In Support Of Response In
Opposition To Defendant's Motions To Dismiss And For Summary
Judgment.ff
4.

[Record 3474-3477].

On April 26, 1995, the Third Judicial District Court,

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, orally granted the motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims
in this proceeding with the exception of the claims against Valley
Mortgage Company.
5.

[Record 3482].

On July 10, 1995, Judge Wilkinson, entered Orders:
a)

memorializing

his

prior

granting

of

Attorney

Gardiner• s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing with prejudice all causes of
action asserted against Attorney Gardiner;
b)

memorializing

his

prior

granting

of

Appellees

Robert J. DeBry, Robert J. Debry & Associates, and
Edward T. Wells1 Motions to Dismiss, dismissing
with

prejudice

all

3

causes

of

action

asserted

Appellees Robert J. Debry, Robert J. DeBry & Associates,
and Edward T. Wells also filed motions to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment.
4

against them; and
c)

continuing the trial date as to Valley Mortgage to
allow Appellants to proceed with the filing of an
appeal of the "court's final order of April 26,
1995."

[Record 3543-3549, 3551-3557 & 3558-3560].
6.

On October 17, 1995, Appellants filed their Notice of

Appeal in this action.
7.

[Record 3588-3590].

On December 11, 1995, Attorney Gardiner filed a Motion

for Summary Disposition of this Appeal with this Court on the basis
that the Notice of Appeal was filed too late for the appellate
court to obtain jurisdiction.

The Utah Supreme Court, by Order

dated March 20, 1996, has deferred ruling on the Motion for Summary
Disposition until further consideration.
C.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS.
The relevant facts set forth herein are undisputed as the

Appellants failed to set forth any evidence pursuant to Rule 56,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to counter the evidence established
by Attorney Gardiner in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, these facts are not in dispute.
E.g. , Schafir v. Harriqan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App.
1994);
1.

see also, infra, section VI.C at pp. 18-20.
On January 24, 1986, Robert J. DeBry and Joan Debry (the

"DeBrys") filed an action styled Robert J. Debry and Joan DeBry,
Plaintiffs v. Cascade Enterprises, et al.. Defendants, in the Third
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Civil No. 860900553, before
5

the Honorable Pat B. Brian (the "Underlying Lawsuit").

rE.g. ,

Record 2850 at f 1J.
2.

In the Underlying Lawsuit, the DeBrys sought to recover

for defects in construction of an office building purchased by the
Debrys

from,

among

others,

Cascade

Enterprises,

Cascade

Construction, and Appellants Del K. Bartel and Dale Thurgood.
[E.g.» Record 2850 at f 2].
3.

Appellants

Bartel

and

Thurgood

filed

against the DeBrys in the Underlying Lawsuit.

counterclaims

rE.g., Record 2850

at 1 3].
4.

Attorney Gardiner did not file the complaint in the

Underlying Lawsuit.

In fact, Attorney Gardiner did not become an

employee of Robert J. DeBry & Associates until July, 1987 and did
not make an entry of appearance in the Underlying Lawsuit on behalf
of the DeBrys until July 31, 1987 —
action was commenced.

more than a year after the

[Record 2850-2851; 2878-2880; 2895 at 5f 2

& 3] .
5.

Pursuant to a scheduling conference held on August 19,

1988, Judge Brian set May 1, 1989 as the discovery cut-off date in
the Underlying Lawsuit.
6.

[Record 2851 at J 5].

As an accommodation, however, Attorney Gardiner allowed

Fidelity National Title to take the deposition of his client, Joan
DeBry, after this discovery cut-off date.
7.

[Record 2851 at J 6].

At the time this deposition was conducted by Fidelity

National Title, the Appellants had already taken and completed
their deposition of Joan Debry.

[Record 2851 at 5 7; 2881-2884].
6

8.

The DeBrys filed a complaint against the Plaintiff in

Federal District Court on February, 1989 under case No. 89C-1811W
(the "Federal Lawsuit").
Federal Lawsuit.
9.

Attorney Gardiner did not file the

[Record 2851 at 5 10; 2894-2898 at J 5].

On March 21, 1989 the Appellants filed a motion to

dismiss the Federal Lawsuit which was opposed by Attorney Gardiner
as counsel for the DeBrys.

[Record 2852 at f 11].

The Federal District Court denied Appellants1 motion to

10.

dismiss the federal civil rights claim by order dated May 25, 1989.
[Record 2852 at J 12; 2899-2900]. Attorney Gardiner, on behalf of
the DeBrys, then stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice of
the related state court claims.

This dismissal of the related

state court claims was agreed to by the DeBrys because those claims
were pending in another forum, not because such claims lacked
merit.

[Record 2852 at 1 12; 2894-2898 at f 7; 2901-2910].

11.

During the course of the Underlying Litigation, Attorney

Gardiner filed a request that Judge Brian recuse himself from
presiding over the lawsuit or, in the alternative, that he be
disqualified from presiding over the lawsuit.
heard

by

Judge Daniels who denied

That motion was

the motion.

Thereafter,

Appellants1 motion for Rule 11 sanctions based on the Motion to
Disqualify was heard by Judge Daniels. The hearing on that motion
for Rule 11 sanctions was held on August 21, 1989.

The judge

denied any Rule 11 sanctions finding that there was a sufficient
basis for bringing the motion.
12.

Pursuant

[Record 2894-2898 at f 13].

to an order of
7

the Third

District Court

effective August 31, 1989, Gardiner was forced to withdraw as
counsel for the DeBrys due to a conflict of interest arising out of
a pending divorce proceeding between Robert and Joan DeBry.
[Record 2851 at ? 8;
13.

2885-2888].*

In December, 1989 the DeBrys filed a second lawsuit

against Appellants Bartel and Thurgood in the Third District Court
under case no. 890907449CV.

Gardiner had terminated his employ

with Robert DeBry & Associates prior to this time and had no
involvement in that lawsuit.

[Record 2852 at 1 13;

2894-2898 at

1 10].
14.

On

or about

February

28,

1990

and

after Attorney

Gardiner's withdrawal as counsel, the Underlying Lawsuit came on
for

a

bifurcated

trial

only

as

to

the

Appellants,

Tri-K

construction and Sherwin Knudsen (collectively "Tri-K"); and Geneva
Rock Products.
15.

[Record 2852 at 1 14; 2911-2917].

On that day, Appellants and Tri-K reached a settlement on

a major aspect of the case.

DeBrys and Appellants also entered

into a settlement stipulation regarding that major aspect of the
case on that day.
16.
settlement

Judge
and

[Record 2852 at 5 14].

Brian
the

executed

an Order

stipulation

between

Appellants on April 17, 1990.
17.

approving
the

the Tri-K

DeBrys

[Record 2853 at ? 16;

and

the

2911-2917].

The trial of the remaining issues between the DeBrys and

4

The DeBrys subsequently divorced and due to
entered into in connection with the divorce wherein
agreed to indemnify Joan, the DeBrys were able to
common representation. [Record 2851 at f 9; 2866;
8

a stipulation
Robert DeBry
proceed with
2889-2993].

the Cascade parties (which included Appellants) in the Underlying
Lawsuit commenced on May 21, 1990 and continued intermittently
until the jury returned its special verdict on June 20, 1990.
[Record 2853 at f 17; 2918-2932].
18.

The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the

DeBrys on some claims and in favor of the Appellants on other
claims.

[Record 2853 at 5 18; 2918-2932].

19.

Thereafter, the DeBrys and Appellants filed various post-

trial motions which were denied in part and granted in part
pursuant to an Order dated March 28, 1991.

[Record 2853 at J 19;

2933-2934].
20.

On June 4, 1991, Judge Brian entered a Judgment on the

Jury's Special Verdict.
21.
11

[Record 2853 at 1 20; 2918-2932].

In his Judgment, Judge Brian specifically found that

[t]here is no prevailing party."

[Record 2853 at f 21; 2918-2932

at p. 14].
22.

Thereafter, both the DeBrys and the Appellants filed

appeals from that Judgment.
23.

[Record 2853 at f 22].

On August 21, 1991, two years after Attorney Gardiner's

withdrawal as counsel for the DeBrys, the Federal Lawsuit was
dismissed on the grounds that the trial court's decision in the
Underlying Lawsuit was res judicata.
24.

[Record 2853-2854 at 5 23].

Appellants commenced the consolidated actions which are

the basis for the instant appeal by filing complaints on or about
June 19, 1992 and June 22, 1992. [Record 2854 at I 24, 1-72; 2-59
(of Dist. Ct. No. 920903543)]. Appellants filed amended complaints
9

in both actions on July 13, 1992 and August 20, 1992. [Record 2854
at 5 24, 73-151;
25.

60-116 (of Dist. Ct. No. 920903543)].

The District Court granted Robert J. DeBry's motion to

dismiss Appellants1 claim for active interference and conspiracy to
commit fraud in March, 1993.

An order memorializing the court!s

decision was not signed and entered at that time.

[Record 2854 at

1 25].
26.

On July 1, 1994, the Utah Supreme Court rendered its

decision on appeal of the Underlying Lawsuit in DeBry v. Cascade
Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994).

Petitions for rehearing

were denied on August 18, 1994. [Record 2854 at J 26; 2935-2954].
27.

The Utah Supreme Court»s decision generally upheld the

damage awards determined by the jury (with some modifications in
amount).

The

Court,

however,

specifically

found

that

the

Appellants did not prove the elements of either an action for fraud
or an action for conspiracy to defraud, and therefore vacated the
punitive damage award. DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1358-1359. [Record 2854
at f 27;
28.

2935-2954].
On March 20, 1995, the Appellants filed their unverified

Consolidated and Amended Complaint in this action.

[Record 2726-

2805]. Attorney Gardiner, among others, filed a Motion to Dismiss,
Or

in

the Alternative

for

Summary

Consolidated Amended Complaint.
29.

Judgment,

on Appellants1

[Record 2839-2842].

On April 26, 1995 the trial court ordered from the bench

dismissal of all of Appellants1 claims against all defendants
except Valley Mortgage.

[Record 3482].
10

30.

On July 20, 1995, Judge Wilkinson entered his Order

dismissing Appellants' Complaint against Attorney Gardiner in its
entirety.
31.

[Record 3543-3549].
On July 10, 1995 the trial court entered its Order

dismissing all claims against all other defendants except Valley
Mortgage.
32.

[Record 3550; 3551-3557; 3558-3560].
On July 10, 1995 the trial court entered its Order

disposing of the claims of Valley Mortgage by continuing the trial
on those claims w[p]rovided that [Appellants] proceed with the
filing of appeal of the Court's final Order of April 26, 1995,
concerning dismissal and summary judgments granted to specific
named defendants."
33.

[Record 3558-3560].

Appellants did not file their Notice of Appeal until

October 27, 1995, more than 100 days after the trial court's July
10, 1995 Orders disposing of all claims as to all parties. [Record
3588-3590] .
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.

Summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Attorney
Gardiner on all of the causes of actions asserted against him by
Appellants, opposing litigants to

Attorney

Gardiner's

former

clients. There are several independent bases upon which the trial
court's judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner should be affirmed.
First, the judgment should be summarily affirmed on the
grounds that Appellants' Brief utterly fails to comply with Rule 24
of

the

Utah

Rules

of

deficiencies, including

Appellate

Procedure.

the complete
11

lack

These

severe

of any meaningful

analysis

of

the

law,

place

Attorney

Gardiner

at

a

severe

disadvantage in responding to Appellants1 assertions. Moreover, it
is a waste of this Courtfs time and resources.

Accordingly, the

Appellants1 Brief should be stricken or, in the least, disregarded
and the judgment of the lower court affirmed.
Second, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal as
a result of the Appellants1 untimely filing of their Notice of
Appeal.

The Notice of Appeal was not filed for more than 100 days

after the trial courtfs simultaneous entry of several orders which
disposed of all claims and which were, by their very terms, final
orders.

Accordingly, this appeal should be dismissed and the

judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner left undisturbed.
Finally, judgment was properly entered in favor of Attorney
Gardiner

as the undisputed evidence

established

that

he was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Appellants1
claims against him.

The undisputed evidence established that the

"wrongful acts" asserted by Appellants against Attorney Gardiner,
during his limited representation of the DeBrys, were typical of
the procedural wrangling that is expected in our adversary system.
In fact, our procedural rules anticipate that these types of
disputes will arise during the course of litigation and those rules
provide for the resolution of disputes involving procedural conduct
of the type Attorney Gardiner purportedly undertook. Moreover, as
a matter of law, those remedies (e.g., sanctions under rules 11 and
37) are the exclusive remedies and preclude the bringing of a
subseguent, collateral action based solely on purported procedural
12

improprieties.

In sum, Attorney Gardiner's actions in connection

with his limited representation of the DeBrys do not give rise to
any of the several causes of action asserted against Attorney
Gardiner by his former clients1

adversaries, the Appellants.

Accordingly, the judgment entered in his favor must be affirmed•
VI.
A.

ARGUMENTS.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN BECAUSE OF
THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY
GARDINER SHOULD BE SUMMARILY AFFIRMED.

Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides in part as
follows:
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant
shall contain under appropriate headings. . .:
(7) A statement of the case. . . . A statement of
the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on.

(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this
Rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a) & (j).
Appellants1 Brief utterly fails to comply with this Rule. They do
13

not set forth the facts relevant to the determination of the
numerous, vague and almost unintelligible issues they claim are
raised by this appeal. Likewise, many of the facts they purport to
set forth are argumentative conclusions, unintelligible, and not
supported by the record.

Moreover, to the extent Appellants

purport to cite to the record, those cites are nothing more than
references to entire pleadings without reference to any particular
page or paragraph.
wastes

the

Each of these Rule 24 deficiencies not only

Courtfs

time,

it

seriously

jeopardizes

Attorney

Gardinerfs ability to respond and the Court should summarily affirm
the trial courtfs judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner.

E.g.,

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("We have
routinely refused to consider arguments which do not include a
statement of the facts properly supported by citations to the
record.")(citations omitted);

State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 601

(Utah Ct. App. 1992)(summarily affirmed lower court where brief
failed to set forth a coherent statement of issues or standard of
review for each issue);

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612-613

(Utah 1987)(do not reach merits where facts not set forth in brief
with citations to the record);

Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,

768 P.2d 950, 970 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(courts will disregard
improper briefs as they cannot afford the effort and time to
prepare

appellant1 s case when the time can be better spent

considering properly presented cases).
The argument portion of the Appellants1 brief also fails to
comply with Rule 24.

It contains neither the contentions nor
14

reasons behind the Appellants1 arguments with respect to the issues
presented.

Moreover, Appellants fail to reference or cite to the

record in connection with the legal authorities they claim are
applicable, nor do Appellants provide any meaningful analysis.
Instead, they choose to simply string cite numerous authorities
without any analysis whatsoever.

These defects also require that

the Court disregard Appellants1 brief and summarily affirm the
lower court's judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner. E.g., State
v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (brief disregarded
where analysis is not meaningful);

Steele v. Board of Review of

Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Court granted
motion to strike where argument section of brief failed to provided
citations to parts of the record relied on therein);
P. 2d at
provided);

601

Yates, 834

(brief disregarded where no meaningful

analysis

English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-619

(Utah Ct. App. 1991)(declined to address issue where legal analysis
not meaningful).

As this Court has noted, "[e]xtensive citations

from numerous case authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot
substitute for the development of appellate arguments explicitly
tied to the record before us." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In sum, it appears as though the Appellants' deficient brief
in this case is very similar to the brief submitted in the Price
case, wherein the Court wrote the following:
We find [appellant's]
the provisions of Rule 24.
a coherent statement of
standard of review for

brief clearly deficient under
The brief fails to set forth
issues and the appropriate
each issue with supporting
15

authority.
The "issues" which are listed do not
correlate with the substance of the brief. [Appellant's]
statement of the case not only omits reference to the
course of proceedings and disposition in the trial court,
but fails to provide a statement of the relevant facts
properly documented by citations to the record.
TAppellant'sl "argument" does not identify any error by
the trial court, refer to the facts or the record, or
cite applicable authority, much less provide any
meaningful factual or legal analysis.
. . . [W]e do expect [appellant1s] brief to intelligibly
present the issues on appeal. rAppellant1s] brief does
not enable us to locate errors in the record or
demonstrate "under applicable authorities" why the errors
necessitate reversal. Therefore, we affirm the trial
courtfs denial of [appellant's] motion to suppress.
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(citations
omitted and emphases added).
As in Price, this Court should summarily affirm the lower court's
ruling for Appellants' blatant failure to comply with numerous,
critical provisions of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules pf Appellate
Procedure.5
B.

APPELLANTS' UNTIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL FAILED TO VEST
JURISDICTION IN THIS COURT AND THE APPEAL SHOULD BE SUMMARILY
DISMISSED.
On July 10, 1995 the trial court entered its Order dismissing

all claims against all defendants, including Attorney Gardiner,
with the exception of Valley Mortgage.

Also on July 10, 1995 the

Court entered its Order disposing of the claims against Valley
Mortgage by continuing the trial on those claims H[p]rovided that
5

Appellants, in their Reply Brief, may seek to cure some
of the numerous defects in their Brief.
That should not be
allowed, however, as Attorney Gardiner would not have an
opportunity to respond and be heard.
Moreover, that is not
properly allowed in a reply brief under the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 24(c).
16

[Appellants] proceed with the filing of appeal of the Court's final
Order of April 26, 1995, concerning dismissal and summary judgments
granted to specific named defendants."

These Orders effectively

disposed of all issues in this case and therefore constitute final
orders.

Indeed, the July 10, 1995 Order on the Valley Mortgage

i

matter expressly referred to the other Orders as "final" Orders and
further directed the plaintiffs, now Appellants, to proceed with
the filing of an appeal of those decisions.6
Pursuant

to Rule

4(a) of the

Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, the Appellants were reguired to file a Notice of Appeal
within 30 days of the entry of the final Orders entered on July 10,
1995, or by August 9, 1995.

Utah R. App. P. 4(a).

This they

failed to do. Their Notice of Appeal was not filed until October
27, 1995, more than 100 days after the Orders were entered.
[Record 3588-3590].
Once the trial court has entered an order that effectively
disposes of all the claims, any previously entered orders that were
not final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
become final. Sepia Enters., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 462 F.2d 115
(6th Cir. 1972); Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764 F.2d
252 (5th Cir. 1985).
It is not necessary that all claims be dealt with on the
merits if it is clear that no further action will be taken in the

6

That Order referencing the other Orders as "final" and
directing the parties to proceed with filing the appeal was
approved as to form by the Appellants, either pro se or through
counsel, as indicated by their signatures thereon.
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trial court on the remaining claims. See Holcomb v. Allis Chalmers
Corp., 774 F.2d 398 (10th Cir. 1985)(Where cross claims would die
from their own weight once main claim decided on merits, judgment
on main claim is final without Rule 54(b) certification.); General
Time

Corp.

v.

Padua

Alarm

Sys.,

199

F.2d

351

(2d

Cir.

1952)(abandonment of remaining claims makes adjudication of other
claims a final judgment without Rule 54(b) certification).
July

The

10, 1995 Orders entered by the trial court effectively

disposed of all claims in the court and they were therefore final
Orders.
Appellants1 filing of a Notice of Appeal significantly more
than 30 days after the entry of those Orders was untimely and, as
a matter of law, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this
appeal.
676

E.g. , Utah R. App. P. 4(a); State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d

(Utah

Ct.

App.

jurisdictional);

1991) (time

for

filing

an

appeal

is

Glezos v. Frontier Inv./ 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995)(court lacked jurisdiction to consider cross-appeal that
was

not

timely

filed).

Accordingly,

this appeal

should be

dismissed and the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner should not
be disturbed.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY
GARDINER ON EACH OF THE EIGHT (8) CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED
AGAINST HIM IN THE TRIAL COURT.
Summary judgment is proper, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

E.g. , Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);
18

Burns v. Cannondale

Bicycle Co. , 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), In connection
with a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56(e) sets forth the
following obligations of a nonmoving party:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)(emphases added).
Moreover, as this Court has noted, when a party "fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case . . . there can be no genuine issue
as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Burns, 876 P.2d
at 419-20 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)).
In response to Attorney Gardiner's motion for summary judgment
which was supported by sworn affidavits and other admissible
evidence, Appellants utterly failed to point with specificity to
any contrary evidence to establish that there were any issues of
material

fact

in

dispute, or

which

support

allegations of their unverified complaint.7
7

the

conclusory

Indeed, in light of

The vast majority of record citations contained in
Appellants' response to Attorney Gardiner's motion for summary
judgment were simply references to the entire record of the
Underlying Litigation. That is improper. E.g., Brown v. Reardon,
770 F.2d 869, 909 (10th Cir. 1985)(A party is reguired to allege
the facts he claims are in dispute and point with specificity to
affidavits or other evidence in the record that supports his
19

Appellants1

failure to produce proper

supporting

evidentiary

material, the judgment granted in favor of Attorney Gardiner was
proper and must be affirmed.

E.g., Franklin Fin, v. New Empire

Dev. Co. . 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983); Schafir v. Harriqan, 879 P.2d
1384, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (summary judgment affirmed where
party failed to rebut evidence established by party moving for
summary judgment);

TS 1 Partnership v. All red. 877 P. 2d 156, 158

(Utah Ct. App. 1994)(MRule 56 requires that the adverse party to
the

summary

judgment

motion

must

respond,

by

affidavit

or

otherwise, in such a manner as to set forth a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.

The adverse party may not rest on mere

allegation.11 Wciting Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.r 836 P.2d 797,
804 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
Appellants1 Consolidated Amended Complaint asserted thirty-two
(32) causes of action against

the various defendants.

The

following eight (8) causes of action were asserted against Attorney
Gardiner:
Fifth Cause of Action:
Tenth Cause of Action:
Eleventh Cause of Action:
Twelfth Cause of Action:
Twenty Second Cause of Action:
Twenty Third Cause of Action:
Twenty Fourth Cause of Action:
Thirty Second Cause of Action:

Abuse of Process
Conspiracy
Interference
Civil Extortion/Coercion
Negligence
Abuse of Process
Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress
Consequential
Damages

These causes of action as they pertain to Attorney Gardiner are
addressed in turn.

contention that the facts are, in reality, disputed.w The court
will not "find the proverbial needle in a paper haystack.11).
20

1.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS' FIFTH AND TWENTY-SECOND
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS.
The centerpiece of Appellants' lawsuit against Attorney

Gardiner is the abuse of process claim,8 If this claim fails, all
of the claims brought by Appellants against Attorney Gardiner fall
like a house of cards.

The abuse of process claim fails as it

lacks both a legal and factual basis, requiring the affirmance of
the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner.
To defeat Attorney Gardiner%s motion to dismiss and for
summary judgment on their abuse of process claim, Appellants were
required to plead and provide record evidence of the following:
1)

Attorney Gardiner used the legal process against
Appellants for an improper purpose (i.e., to
accomplish a purpose other than the purpose for
which the process was designed);

2)

Appellants were damaged thereby; and

3)

The underlying proceedings terminated in favor of
the Appellants.

Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)(emphasis added); Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d
451, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (1974);
Restatement (Second) of Torts
§§ 674(b), 682 (1976).
Appellants1 claim fails as the undisputed evidence shows that the
underlying

proceedings were

not

terminated

in

favor of

the

Appellants and, moreover, Attorney Gardinerfs use of process was
not improper.

8

Appellants1 Amended Complaint asserts two causes of
action for abuse of process (the fifth and twenty-third causes of
action). The causes of action are redundant and, therefore, this
Brief's discussion of the abuse of process "claim" actually
pertains to both of Appellants1 abuse of process claims.
21

a)

Appellants1 Abuse Of Process Claim Fails As The
Underlying Lawsuit Did Not Terminate In Their Favor,
An abuse of process claim requires that the underlying

proceedings terminated in favor of the party who subsequently
brings the abuse of process claim. As a matter of law, Appellants1
abuse of process claim must fail as they clearly were not the
prevailing party of the underlying action.
The abuse of process allegations made by the Appellants, more
fully discussed below, assert that Attorney Gardiner and other
Appellees abused the process in connection with the Underlying
Lawsuit.

The express terms of the Judgment in the Underlying

Lawsuit provide, however, that Appellants were not prevailing
parties.

At page 14 of the 1991 Judgment, Judge Brian expressly

indicated that "There is no prevailing party" and each party was to
bear its own attorneys fees and costs.9
14].

[Record 2918-2932 at p.

That finding by Judge Brian in 1991, which was not disturbed

by the Utah Supreme Court on appeal,10 was entirely consistent with
the undisputed evidence that the DeBrys were awarded judgment
against,

inter

alia,

the

Appellants

construction of the office building.

based

on

their

faulty

[Jd. at p. 4]. Moreover,

9

This ruling by Judge Brian that no attorney's fees or
costs should be imposed has particular significance. Since Judge
Brian had specific statutory authority to impose attorneys1 fees
sanctions had he determined that the action was improperly filed or
pursued, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, and he chose not to do so,
this Court should be reluctant to second guess his decision through
a collateral action.
10

The Supreme Court refused to rule on the issue because
Appellants failed to raise the issue below. DeBry v. Cascade
Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1364 (Utah 1994).
22

Judge Brian's finding was entirely consistent with the fact that
the Appellants and Appellee DeBrys entered into a settlement on a
major aspect of the Underlying Lawsuit in February, 1990 —

after

Attorney Gardiner's forced withdrawal.
Finally, it should be noted that on appeal the Utah Supreme
Court specifically found that the Appellants did not prove the
elements of either an action for fraud or an action for conspiracy
to defraud, and therefore vacated the punitive damage award against
the DeBrys.
1994).
were

DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah

Accordingly, the trial court's 1991 Judgment that there

no prevailing parties, coupled with a major settlement

effected after Attorney Gardiner's withdrawal and the Utah Supreme
Court's decision affirming major relief in favor of the DeBrys
against Appellants preclude any finding that Appellants were the
"prevailing party" and their abuse of process claim must fail as a
matter of law.
b)

Appellants' Abuse Of Process Claim Also Fails As The
Undisputed Evidence Conclusively Establishes That
Attorney Gardiner Represented The DeBrys Only During A
Narrow Window And The Wrongs Alleged Against Him
Constitute Nothing More Than A Zealous Representation Of
His Client And Were Not Improper.
Appellants did not, and could not, counter the evidence

that Attorney Gardiner's participation in the Federal Lawsuit and
the Underlying Lawsuit was anything but properly pursued and aimed
at obtaining a proper adjudication of the disputes between the
parties. Thus, judgment was properly granted in favor of Attorney
Gardiner because based on the undisputed evidence the "improper
23

purpose" element of the abuse of process claim could not be
satisfied.
1)

Attorney Gardiner's Actions In Connection With The
Federal Lawsuit Were Proper.
The undisputed record evidence establishes that

Attorney Gardinerfs only involvement in the Federal Lawsuit was the
successful defense of a Motion to Dismiss that had been brought
against his clients, the DeBrys, and his appearance at a subsequent
scheduling conference on July 31, 1989.
10-12;

2894-2898

at

ff

5-9].

[Record 2851-2852 at ff

Attorney

Gardiner

did

not

participate in either the drafting or filing of the Federal Lawsuit
against the Appellants, nor is there any allegation that he did so.
[Record 2851 at f 10; 2894-2898 at f 5; 2726-2805]. The Federal
District Court denied Appellants1 motion to dismiss the federal
civil rights claims in the Federal Lawsuit which was opposed by
Attorney Gardiner.11

[Record 2852 at Jf 11-12;

2899-2900].

The

Appellants cannot successfully assert that Attorney Gardiner's
conduct in connection with the Federal Lawsuit was improper or done
with an improper purpose when his clients prevailed on the only
motion in which he was involved.12

11

Attorney Gardiner did stipulate to the dismissal of the
related state claims, not because they were frivolous, but because
they were already pending in the Underlying Lawsuit. Accordingly,
the District Court did dismiss those related state claims without
prejudice. [Record 2894-2898 at 1 7; 2899-2910].
12

Moreover, the eventual dismissal of the Federal Lawsuit
resulted from the fact the state court had litigated the issues and
that judgment was res judicata. There was never any substantive
adjudication or determination of the DeBry's claims by the Federal
Court.
24

2)

Appellants1 Allegations That Attorney Gardiner
Refused To Allow Re-Cross Examination Of Mrs. DeBry
Do Not Constitute Abuse Of Process.
Appellants attempt to bootstrap Attorney Gardiner's

refusal to allow another deposition of Mrs. DeBry after the
discovery cut-off into an abuse of process claim.

That argument

simply fails as a matter of law. Appellants1 allegations regarding
Mrs. DeBry!s deposition are as follows:
139. That deposition of Joan DeBry was called for by
defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company in
1990 before the main trial.
140. That Joan DeBry appeared at the deposition and
answered questions as directed by Lynn McMurray, counsel
for Fidelity.
141. That [Appellant] Del K. Bartel attempted to examine
Joan DeBry based upon her prior responses, but was
precluded from doing so by Dale Gardiner, the DeBrys
counsel of record.
142. That the DeBrys failure to allow examination,
through the actions of their attorney, served to
frustrate the regular conduct of these discovery
procedures and constitutes abuse of process.
The Court should note that a motion to compel would have
immediately addressed the "due process deprivation" asserted by
Appellants.

Appellants also could object to the use of the

deposition at trial should the eventuality arise.

Yet Appellants

did not raise the matter before the court in the Underlying
Litigation.

Appellants' failure to raise the issue in the trial

court forecloses their right to raise the issue in a subsequent,
collateral action.13

Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d

13

Indeed, Appellant Del Bartel understood the importance
and availability of the remedy in the trial court when he stated
that he would allow the court to decide the dispute when not
25

120, 123 (Utah 1994)(exclusive redress for procedural defect is to
raise the issue in the court where it arose, not in subsequent
lawsuit);

see also

Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th

Cir. 1983)(proper remedy for overly broad subpoena is motion to
quash, not subsequent civil rights action);

Rincrwood v. Foreign

Auto Work, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App.)(res judicata
bars relitigation of issues that were presented in first suit or
could and should have been raised in the first action), cert,
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
Even if the Appellants could properly base a subsequent
lawsuit on this discovery dispute, Attorney Gardiner's refusal to
allow Appellants to again re-cross examine Mrs. DeBry does not rise
to the level of egregious conduct needed in an abuse of process
action.

The undisputed evidences establishes that the Appellants

had already taken and completed their deposition of Mrs. DeBry.14
Moreover, the deposition about which Appellants complain occurred
after the discovery cut-off and was an accommodation made by
Attorney Gardiner.
Based on the foregoing, judgment was properly granted in favor
of Attorney Gardiner on Appellants1 abuse of process claim based on
his refusal to allow the re-cross examination of Mrs. DeBry by the
Appellants.

allowed to re-cross examine Mrs. Debry.
14

[Record 2958-2964].

Counsel for the Appellants, Mark Larsen, completed his
deposition of Mrs. DeBry on August 18, 1988 by stating ffThat is all
I have." [Record 2881-3884].
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3)

Appellants1
Claim
That
Attorney
Gardiner
Unsuccessfully Attempted To Recuse Judge Brian Is
Not Abuse Of Process.
Regarding the attempt to recuse and disqualify Judge

Brian, Appellants1 unverified Amended Complaint alleges:
188. In an attempt to postpone the 1989 trial date and
obtain an extension of time to get expert witnesses back
in the action, DeBrys unsuccessfully attempted to recuse
Judge Brian.
As set forth more fully above, the Appellants had a full and
complete remedy available to them in the event they deemed any
attempt to recuse Judge Brian as improper, i.e., a Rule 11 motion.
Indeed, the Appellants filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions which
was denied by Judge Daniels, the judge who ruled on the motion to
disqualify.

In fact, Judge Daniels, in his contemporaneous denial

of Rule 11 sanctions, expressly found that there was a sufficient
basis for bringing the motion.

[Record 2894-2898 at 113]. The

Appellants thereafter made no attempt to appeal the denial of Rule
11 sanctions either on an interlocutory basis or after the final
judgment was rendered.
Appellants1

Therefore, any subsequent claims such as

abuse of process claim and other claims based on

similar allegations are res judicata.

E.g., Thayne, 874 P.2d 120,

123 (Utah 1994); Barnard, 720 F.2d at 1189; Ringwood, 786 P.2d at
1357.
4)

Attorney Gardiner's Forced Withdrawal As Counsel
For The DeBrys Does Not And Cannot Constitute Abuse
Of Process.
Appellants1 next attempt to assert an abuse of

process claim against Attorney Gardiner involves the reasons for
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which he withdrew as counsel for the DeBrys in the lawsuit.

The

Amended Complaint alleges as follows:
189. DeBryfs second tactic to postpone trial involved
the withdrawal of Dale Gardiner as counsel of record,
that withdrawal being denied by the court.
190. That after having failed to recuse Judge Brian and
to effect Dale Gardiner's withdrawal, the DeBrys
successfully called for postponement of the trial, citing
a conflict of interest between Robert DeBry and Joan
DeBry based upon their pending divorce.
191.
That after postponement of trial in 1989, the
DeBrys unaccountably effected the resolution of any
conflict that previously existed and they proceeded to
trials in February 1990 and May 1990 in this litigation
with common representation.
During the pendency of the Underlying Lawsuit, Joan DeBry
filed divorce proceedings against Robert DeBry.

This created an

obvious conflict as to the issue of the potential liability of one
party for the actions of the other, i.e., both Robert and Joan were
co-plaintiffs and counter-defendants in the Underlying Lawsuit.
This conflict of interest was brought to the trial court's
attention on July 19, 1989, at which time the trial court held in
abeyance Attorney Gardiner's motion to withdraw pending efforts by
the DeBrys to settle the conflict.

[Record 2865-2866].

At that

hearing, Mrs. DeBry's divorce lawyer made an appearance and
confirmed the reality of the conflict.

[Id.].

Judge Brian then

stated that if the DeBry's did not resolve their conflict of
interest by August 30, 1989, he would approve Attorney Gardiner's
withdrawal as counsel.

[Id.].

As of August 31, 1989, no settlement had been reached.

As a

result, Judge Brian approved Gardiner's withdrawal as counsel for
28

the DeBrys due to a conflict of interest.

[Record 2885-2888].

Thus, Attorney Gardiner withdrew, and quit his employment with
Robert J. DeBry & Associates.
The DeBrys subsequently divorced and due to a stipulation
entered into in connection with the divorce wherein Robert DeBry
agreed to indemnify Joan, the DeBrys were able to proceed with
common representation.

[Record 2851 at f 9;

2866;

2889-2993].

The uncontroverted evidence establishes that this conflict was
genuine and therefore, as a matter of law, Attorney Gardiner is
entitled to judgment on Appellants1 abuse of process claim.
5)

Appellants1
Allegations
Regarding
Attorney
Gardinerfs
"Hiding,
Losing
and
Destroying"
Documents Did Not Create An Abuse Of Process.

Finally, Appellants1 made an unsupported allegation that
Attorney

Gardiner

discovery.

destroyed, hid

or

lost

documents sought

in

Appellants did not submit any evidence in support of

their allegation and, moreover, there is none.

The undisputed

evidence establishes that Attorney Gardiner produced all documents
provided
Attorney

to him,
Gardiner

Appellants.

[Record 3408-3411 at f
contemporaneously

[Record 3425].

3;

confirmed

3422-3424] ,15 and
that

fact

to

Finally, this type of perceived

procedural wrong should have been resolved by a motion to compel
pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It does

not rise to an abuse of process claim and, as a matter of law,
15

Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that all
relevant documents were produced by the DeBrys to Attorney
Gardiner, who in turn provided them to Appellants. [Record 34223424; 3408-3411 at 5 3 ] .
29

cannot serve as the basis for a subsequent, collateral action.
E.g. , Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah
1994)(exclusive redress for procedural defect is to raise the issue
in the court where it arose, not in subsequent lawsuit);

Barnard

v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188, 1189 (10th Cir. 1983)(proper remedy for
overly broad subpoena is motion to quash, not subsequent civil
rights action);

Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Work, Inc., 786 P.2d

1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App.)(res judicata bars relitigation of issues
that were presented in first suit or could and should have been
raised in the first action), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah
1990).

Thus, the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner on the

abuse of process claim should be affirmed.
c.

Appellants1 Abuse of Process Claim Based On Purported
Procedural Improprieties Cannot, As A Matter Of Law, Be
Pursued In A Collateral Action And Attorney Gardiner Is
Entitled To Judgment In His Favor.
Each of the "wrongful acts" which purportedly serve as

the basis for the abuse of process claim against Attorney Gardiner
is typical of the procedural wrangling that is expected in our
adversary system.

In fact, the procedural rules anticipate that

these types of disputes will arise during the course of litigation
between procedural adversaries, and a process for their resolution
is provided.

Under the rules, the acts performed by Attorney

Gardiner are specifically authorized so long as the constraints of
Rules 11 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are observed.
In the event those bounds are believed to have been crossed,
summary remedy is provided —

in the very action where the
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violation is suspected, before the trial judge fully versed in the
facts, circumstances and prior conduct of both parties and who is
best suited to judge the bona fides of the procedural posture
taken.

Should a violation be found, a full panoply of remedies is

available in the trial court including summary resolution of the
violation, attorney fees, and sanctions if appropriate.

Should a

litigant fail to avail himself of those remedies or fail to perfect
an appeal if denied, he cannot pursue redress for those alleged
procedural improprieties in a collateral action.
at 123;

Barnard, 720 F.2d at 1189;

Thayne, 874 P.2d

Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357.

Accordingly, judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner on Appellants1
claims,

all

of

which

are

based

on

perceived

procedural

irregularities, was proper and should be affirmed.
2.

Gardiner

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 "CONSPIRACY" (TENTHS
CAUSE OF ACTION.
The

undisputed

was

entitled

"conspiracy" claim.

evidence
to

establishes

summary

judgment

that
on

Attorney

Appellants'

To defeat Attorney Gardiner's motion on their

civil conspiracy claim, Appellants were required to allege and cite
record evidence to prove the following:

(1)

a combination of two

or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of
the minds on the object or course of action,
acts, and

(5) damages

as

(4)

one or more

unlawful,

overt

a proximate

result

thereof.

E.g., Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790

(Utah Ct. App. 1987Hciting Citizen State Bank v. Gilmore, 603 P.2d
605 (Kan. 1979)).
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Appellants1 Amended Complaint alleges that Attorney Gardiner's
participation with Robert J. DeBry & Associates and the DeBrys in
the action set forth in paragraph 267 (a) through (j) constitute a
conspiracy. Appellants further allege "that these acts constitute
negligence, abuse of process, malicious prosection, violation of
civil rights, fraud upon the court, [and] intentional and gross
misconduct at trial."

[Record 2726-2805 at f 268].

The undisputed evidence submitted by Attorney Gardiner and
which was unrefuted by Appellants establishes that, with respect to
each of Appellants1 allegations, Attorney Gardiner either had no
involvement or his actions were lawful.16

As a matter of law, if

the object of the alleged conspiracy or the means used to attain it
were lawful, there can be no civil action for conspiracy even if
the plaintiff suffers damages and even if the defendant did act
with a malicious motive.

Israel, 746 P.2d at 792.

The undisputed evidence establishes, with regard to each
specific allegation contained in paragraph 267 of the Consolidated
Amended Complaint, the following:
(a)

The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner did

not work with a private detective to obtain Appellants1
16

Appellants failed to show that there was any agreement
between any of the parties or a meeting of the minds on the object
or course of action of the conspiracy. This lack of evidence can
be seen by the fact that Appellants1 Consolidated Amended Complaint
filed nearly three years after the initial complaint still
contained general, vague allegations and, in fact, failed to allege
any agreement at all. Instead, the Complaint asserts that there
was simply a "participation" between the parties.
Moreover,
Appellants did not submit any evidence to support this cause of
action
in opposition to Attorney
Gardinerfs Motion to
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment.
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personal and confidential information in violation of a court
order.
(b)

[Record 2898-2898 at Jll; 3408-3411 at 5 6].

The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish

Attorney

Gardiner did not wrongfully expand or protract

litigation as more fully discussed supra, at pp. 23-30,
Moreover, Appellants failure to seek a timely remedy of any
alleged

misconduct

Beneficial

Utah,

is

res

judicata.

Inc., 874 P.2d

E.g.,

120, 123

Thayne

(Utah

v.

1994);

Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Work, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
(c)

The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish

Attorney Gardiner did not prosecute any groundless companion
cases.

More specifically, his limited involvement in the

Federal Lawsuit entailed only his successful defense of a
motion to dismiss and a scheduling conference. Clearly, given
his victory on the motion to dismiss his participation cannot
be deemed groundless.
(d)

The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner did

not participate in hiding allegations that the DeBrys caused
28 different contractors to make defective modification to the
building.

[Record 2898-2898 at 111].

To the extent this

allegation is a restatement of the Appellants1 fraud claim on
which the Supreme Court ruled against Appellants, that ruling
is res judicata.
(e)

The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner did

not withhold any discovery from Appellants, [Record 3408-3411
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at 5 3;

3422-3424; 3425], and Appellants1 failure to seek a

timely remedy is res judicata. E.g. , Thayne, 874 P. 2d at 123;
Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357.
(f) The undisputed evidence establishes Attorney Gardiner was
not involved in the alleged "escalating litigation in regard
to engineering defects that [Appellants] were not liable for."
[Record 2898-2898 at 111].

Moreover, this allegation is

simply a restatement of the fraud claim previously decided
against Appellants by the Supreme Court.
(g) The

undisputed

conclusively

evidence

establish

Attorney

and

prior

court

rulings

Gardiner

simply

pursued

meritorious litigation on behalf of a client and, as a matter
of law, such activity is lawful and there can be no civil
action for conspiracy resulting from lawful conduct, even if
the opposing party is incidentally damaged. E.g., Israel/ 746
P.2d at 792.
(h)

The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish

that Attorney

Gardiner did not submit any meritless or

frivolous motions to recuse and disqualify Judge Brian.

In

fact, Judge Daniels, in his contemporaneous denial of Rule 11
sanctions, expressly found that there was a sufficient basis
for bringing the motion.

[Record 2894-2898 at 513].

That

ruling, coupled with Appellants1 failure to seek a timely
remedy by challenging the denial of Rule 11 sanctions, is res
judicata. E.g. , Thayne, 874 P.2d at 123; Ringwood, 786 P.2d
at 1357.
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(i) There is no allegation that, while Attorney Gardiner was
acting as the DeBry!s counsel, Appellants requested any
information regarding whether a certificate of occupancy could
have been obtained.

To the extent Appellants are attempting

to again interject a fraud claim, the same is barred as a
result of the Supreme Court1s prior decision that there was no
fraud proved in the Underlying Lawsuit.

DeBry v. Cascade

Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994).
(j) The undisputed evidence and prior court rulings establish
that the Federal Lawsuit was not meritless.

Moreover,

Attorney Gardiner's short participation in that lawsuit cannot
be deemed meritless as he successfully defeated a motion to
dismiss made by the Appellants.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the undisputed evidence
establishes that with respect to each and every allegation Attorney
Gardiner either did not participate in the acts complained of or
his actions were entirely lawful.

In either event the Appellants

are barred as a matter of law from asserting this conspiracy claim
and the lower court's judgment in Attorney Gardiner's favor should
be affirmed.
3.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR "TORTIOUS CONDUCT, INTERFERENCE, AND PRIMA FACIE
TORT."
Appellants eleventh cause of action purports to state

claims for "tortious conduct," "interference," and "prima facie
tort."

That cause of action, however, utterly fails to state the
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elements of any recognizable cause of action. Moreover, it appears
to be yet another attempt to plead what is essentially an abuse of
process claim.

The trial court's judgment in favor of Attorney

Gardiner on this cause of action, therefore, was also proper on the
bases set forth supra at section VI.C.l, pp. 21-31.
4.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS! TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR CIVIL EXTORTION AND COERCION.
Appellants1 allegations on this cause of action assert

the wrongful use of the legal process "by manipulating, extending,
and protracting the litigation" in order to extort or coerce
Appellants to abandon legal rights and incur legal expenses.
[Record 2726-2805 at 5f 284-296].

The term "extort" is legally

defined as to "compel or coerce . . .

or to gain by wrongful

methods. . . or to obtain in an unlawful manner."
Dictionary

(5th Ed. 1979) at p. 525.

Black's Law

Extortion on its face,

therefore, presumes the use of improper means for an improper
purpose.

Appellants1

extortion/coercion

cause

of

action,

therefore, is just another attempt to assert the abuse of process
claim which, as discussed supra at section VI.C.l, pp. 21-31, fails
as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment entered in favor of
Attorney Gardiner on this claim should be affirmed.
5.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 TWENTY-SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE.
Appellants1 negligence claim against Attorney Gardiner

alleges that he "knowingly," "willfully," "intentionally," and with
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"knowledge" participated in various wrongful actions, and that he
"negligently participated with the DeBrys in pursuing meritless
litigation."

[Record 2726-2805 at 5f 378-384]. Appellants further

allege that as a result Attorney Gardiner "caused the [Appellants]
to rely upon these false representations to [Appellants'] damage
and detriment."

[Id. at f 387].

Appellants have in substance

alleged a fraud claim by pleading the key elements of intent,
reliance and damages, but have attempted to mask this claim under
the guise of negligence.

The obvious purpose in doing so was to

avoid the res judicata effect of the Supreme Court's express ruling
on appeal that the Appellants' did not prove the elements of an
action for fraud in the Underlying Lawsuit.

DeBry, 879 P. 2d at

1358.17
In addition to the claim being barred under the doctrine of
res judicata, the negligence claim also fails because, as a matter
of law, Attorney Gardiner did not owe any duty to the Appellants,
opposing parties in litigation.

As the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals has noted:
Attorneys engaged in discharging their professional duties to
their clients should not be held liable for negligence towards
third persons because their paramount and exclusive duty is to
their clients, and there is no room for the existence of a
duty running to the adversary.
Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979);

17

see also Bird v.

Appellants1 allegations under this negligence cause of
action also parallel the alleged misconduct purportedly giving rise
to the abuse of process claim. Given that Attorney Gardiner is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the abuse of process
claim, he is entitled to judgment on this negligence claim for the
same reasons.
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Rothman, 627 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (negligence is improper
standard upon which to base liability of attorney to an adverse
party given the adverse relation), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 865
(1981).

Absent a duty owing from an attorney to his adversaries,

the negligence claim fails as a matter of law.

For the foregoing

reasons, the judgment in favor of Attorney Gardiner on Appellants1
negligence claim should be affirmed.
6.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 TWENTY-FOURTH CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS.
A claim for the intentional infliction of emotional

distress under Utah law requires proof that the defendant's alleged
wrongdoing directly resulted in "severe" or "extreme" emotional
distress.

E.g., Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961); White

v. Blackburn, 787 P. 2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Appellants

neither plead nor produced any evidence that they suffered severe
Appellants1 failure to allege an

or extreme emotional distress.
essential

element

of

the

tort

of

intentional

emotional distress is grounds for dismissal.

infliction

of

Boisjolv v. Morton

Thiokol, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 795, 801 (D. Utah 1988).
Moreover, a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress

requires

that

the

defendant's

actions

constitute

"outrageous conduct" which is "of such a nature as to be considered
outrageous

and

intolerable

in that

they

offend

against

the

generally accepted standards of decency and morality" and that such
conduct exceeded "all bounds of that usually tolerated in civilized
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society." White, 787 P.2d at 1317, Again, there was no allegation
or

evidence

undisputed

to

support

evidence

Appellants1

conclusively

claim.18

establishes

In
that

fact, the
Attorney

Gardinerfs limited involvement in the Underlying Litigation and
Federal Lawsuit does not constitute the type of severely outrageous
conduct Appellants must prove to prevail on this claim. E.g.,
Samms, 358 P.2d

at 346-347;

White, 787 P.2d

at 1317-1318.

Accordingly, judgment was properly granted in favor of Attorney
Gardiner and that ruling should be affirmed.
7.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN FAVOR OF
ATTORNEY GARDINER ON APPELLANTS1 THIRTY-SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR "CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES."
Appellants1

assert a separate

cause

of action for

"consequential damages." This is not a cause of action under Utah
law and was properly dismissed in favor of Attorney Gardiner.
D.

TO THE EXTENT THEY SEEK TO DO SO, APPELLANTS CANNOT PURSUE A
CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM AGAINST ATTORNEY GARDINER AS HE WOULD BE
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON SUCH CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Appellants' Brief, which fails to comply with Rule 24 of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, purports to set forth some
"argument" that Appellants have a "civil rights" claim.

While

Appellants do not appear to be asserting this claim against
Attorney Gardiner, this Brief will set forth the reasons Appellants
cannot prevail on this claim as a matter of law.
18

Appellants1 allegations are simply that Attorney Gardiner
actively interfered with completion of the building; that he
conspired with others to perpetuate fraud; and that he improperly
used the legal process generally. [Record 2726-2805 at 5f 393400] .
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As a preliminary matter, such a claim was clearly not pled as
to Attorney Gardiner and, as a result, the claim should be
dismissed.

Moreover, even if the Appellants could, which they

cannot, allege any facts to support such a claim, the claim must
fail.

In order to state a cause of action for a violation of civil

rights, a plaintiff must show government action in the conduct
complained of. Barnard v. Young. 720 F.2d 1188, 1189-90 (10th Cir.
1983).

The only arguable government action would be that Attorney

Gardiner was a lawyer licensed by the State.19 That very argument,
however, has been rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as
they have ruled that such licensure does not provide the state
action component of a civil rights claim.

Barnard, 720 F.2d at

1189 ("private attorneys, by virtue of being officers of the court,
do not act under color of state law within the meaning of section
1983")(citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)).
Accordingly, to the extent the "civil rights" claim is asserted
against Attorney Gardiner, he is entitled to summary judgment on
that claim.
VII.

RELIEF SOUGHT.

Attorney Gardiner asks this Court to affirm the judgment
entered by the July 10, 1995 Order of the Honorable Homer Wilkinson
in favor of Attorney Gardiner dismissing with prejudice all causes
19

That Attorney Gardiner is forced to guess as to what
Appellants are or might argue is necessitated by Appellants failure
to comply with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Appellants should not be rewarded for violating the Court's
rules by having this unfair and undue hardship placed on Attorney
Gardiner.
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of action asserted against him.
VIII.

NO ADDENDUM IS NECESSARY.

No addendum is necessary pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
DATED this S5"L d a Y

of

January, 1997.
ATKIN & LILJA, P.C.

appellat.brf
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